AEROSPACE REPORT NUMBER: TOR-20098591-13, SPACE VEHICLE FAILURE MODES, EFFECTS, AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS (FMECA) GUIDE (15-JUN-2009)

AEROSPACE REPORT NUMBER: TOR-20098591-13, SPACE VEHICLE FAILURE MODES, EFFECTS, AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS (FMECA) GUIDE (15-JUN-2009)., Failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) is not being used effectively in unmanned space vehicle (SV) developments as a reliability and systems engineering tool to identify and mitigate design, architecture, and fault management risks. As a result, National Space programs have been surprised late in the life cycle [in integration and test (I&T) or on orbit] with the late identification of critical failures, single-point failures, unintended fault effects, and the associated reductions to system reliability. Consequently, the Mission Assurance Improvement Workshop (MAIW) FMECA Team was established to provide detailed guidance to the unmanned space vehicle and launch vehicle industry by preparing this SV FMECA Guide and presenting it at the Mission Assurance Improvement Workshop on 12�13 May 2009. From this point forward, �space vehicle� refers to space vehicle and launch vehicles. The FMECA team charter was as follows:  Identify existing references and assess best practices for FMECA across the domestic and international space industry. Establish a current and relevant guidance document explaining the different levels and types of FMECA which can be performed over the life cycle of a National Space Program. Provide recommendations on the scope of FMECA which should be performed as a function of system or product complexity, life-cycle phase, and space vehicle classes.  Focus on FMECA for space vehicle design (exclude manufacturing/I&T process FMECA)  Define the interface between FMECA and Fault Management This document applies to the customer program office, contractor program office, and subcontractors. The intended audience for this guide is FMECA planners and performers, namely system/subsystem designers, component (black box, instrument, etc.) designers and reliability engineers. This group forms a critical core team responsible for identifying, eliminating, or mitigating unacceptable failure modes (those leading to failure of the mission). This guide provides a framework to review the design, identify potential failure modes, and assess the effects of the failures. A system-level assessment is performed to determine if the system is robust to the identified failure modes or requires remediation. This work is performed iteratively over the program life cycle in a collaborative effort between the acquisition team (customer), contractor�s system/subsystem engineering, unit engineering and reliability engineering, teams in an effort to ensure the system design is robust, will meet customer requirements, and conforms to program-level cost and schedule milestones as shown in Figure 1.